Intermediary’s information advantage

Sandra Knispel talking about the study done by American Economic Review.

Two financial economists, from the University of Rochester and the University of Wisconsin–Madison respectively, created a model that explains how reputation, information, and retention interact in professions where skill is essential and performance is both visible and attributable to a specific person, particularly in fields such as law, consulting, fund asset management, auditing, and architecture. They argue that much of the professional services world operates through “intermediaries”—firms that both hire employees (also referred to as “agents” or “managers”) and market their expertise to clients—because clients can’t themselves easily judge a worker’s ability from the outset.

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At the start of an employee’s career, the firm has an advantage, Kaniel and his coauthor Dmitry Orlov contend, because the firm (“the mediator”) can assess an employee’s talent more accurately than outside clients can. During what the authors call “quiet periods,” the firm keeps those who perform adequately and pays them standard wages.

Over time, however, an employee’s public performance—measured by successful cases, profitable investments, or well-executed projects—reduces the firm’s informational advantage. As the informational gap shrinks, the firm needs to pay some employees more because clients are now able to observe an employee’s good performance and hence update their beliefs about the employee’s skills.

“At some point, the informational advantage becomes fairly small,” says Kaniel, “and the firm says, ‘Well, I will basically start to churn. I will let go of some employees, and by doing that, I can actually extract more from the remaining ones.’”

Ironically, to the client these churned—or strategically fired—employees look just as good as the ones whom the firm kept. Churning happens not because these employees have failed but because they may be just somewhat lower-skilled than their peers. Subsequently, churning heightens both the reputation of the firm and of the employees who remain.

I found the concept of information advantage and its subsequent shrinking intriguing.

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